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30 HrLYAR v. UNION leE Co. C.2d 
A. No. 23223. In Bank. 
RA Y:M:OND E. HIL Y AR, a Minor, etc., Appellant, v. UNION 
ICE COMPANY (a Corporation) et al., Respondents. 
Dismissal-Nonsuit--When Motion Granted.--A nonsuit may 
be granted only when, conflicting evidence and 
giving plaintiff's evidence all the value to which it is 
entitled, indulging in every legitimate inference which may 
be drawn tlwrcfrom, the resua is a determination that there 
is no evidence of sufficient substantblity to support a verdict 
for plaintiff. 
[2] Automobilea-Nonsuit.-In an action for injuries to a 51fz-
year-old boy who was struck by nn ice truck operating on the 
private streets of a trailer camp, it was error to grant a non-
suit as to defendant truck d:river where it could have been 
inferred, from pictures of the truck in evidence, that a small 
child could have been directly in front of the cab or at either 
side without being seen by the dri vcr unless he were keeping 
a close watch for children nnd that, when looking through the 
rear-view mirrors, he might have missed seeing a small child 
directly in front of him; where it could have been inferred, 
from the child's statement that the truck hit him and ran over 
his back, that he was either in front of the truck as it made 
a turn or slightly to its ldt; and where it could have been 
inferred, from the driver's testimony that he did not see the 
child, that he failed to see the child because he wns not exer-
cising the care commensurate with the danger to be avoided 
in that he knew small children played in the area and knew, 
or should have known, that children aTe unpredictable. 
[3] Negligence-Ordinary Care.-All persons are required to use 
ordinary care to prevent others from being injured as the 
result of their conduct, and ordinary care is that degree of 
care which people of ordinarily prudent behavior can be reason-
ably expected to exercise under the circumstances of a given 
case. 
[4) Id.-Care Proportioned to Danger.-The ordinary care required 
of per8ons to prevent others being injured as the result of 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Dismissal, Discontinuance and Nonsuit, § 48; 
Am.Jur., Dismissal, Discontinuance and N onmit, § 42. 
[ 4] See Cal.Jur., N Pgligence, § 24; Am.Jur., Neg-ligence, § 31. 
!.l[cK. Dig. References: [1] [2, 13, 16] Auto-
mobiles,§ 273a; § 23; [5, 6] 
Automobiles, § 122; (7] Automobiles, 
§276: [91 AutomobilPs, ~2()2(1); (10] ~Hl; [11.12] 
Eviden(;c1 8 655(1); lUJ .\gcucy, ~ 13. 
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their acts must be in proportion to the danger to be avoided 
and the consequences that might reasonably be anticipated. 
Automobiles-Care Toward Ohildren.-The presence of chil-
dren is in itself a warning to driver of motor vehicle requiring 
the exercise of care for their safety. 
Id.-Oare Toward Ohildren.-If the evidence shows that a 
motor vehicle driver had knowledge of the presence of chil-
he may be held responsible for injury to a child al-
though it appears that he did not see child in time to prevent 
the injury. 
!d.-Province of Court and Jury-Care Toward Children.-In 
an aetion for injuries to a 5%-year-old boy who was struek by 
an ice truck operating on the private streets of a trailer camp, 
where the truck driver knew that children were playing in the 
area and testified that he had warned children away from 
the truck and that he had not sounded his horn from the time 
he started it up until plaintiff was hit, and where the accident 
occurred not far from the child's home, it was daylight and 
the view was unobstructed, the trier of fact might have con-
cluded that the driver's conduct was not the degree of care 
required of one using a dangerous instrumentality in the 
immediate vicinity of small children, and such issue should 
have been submitted to the jury. 
[8] !d.-Province of Court and Jury-Signals.-In an action for 
injuries to a 5lj2 -year-old boy who was struck by an ice truck 
operating on the private streets of a trailer camp, whether 
under the circumstances presented it was "reasonably neces-
sary" to sound the horn to "insure safe operation" of the truck 
(Veh. Code, § 671, sub d. (b)) should have been a question of 
fact for the jury. 
[9] !d.-Province of Court and Jury-Proximate Cause.-In an 
action for injuries to a 5%-year-old boy who was struck by an 
ice truck operating on the private streets of a trailer camp, 
whether or not under the circumstances presented defendant 
driver~s failure to sound the horn or his failure to look more 
closely for children in his way constituted the proximate cause 
of plaintiff's injuries should have been submitted to the jury. 
[10] Negligence-Evidence.-An absence of eyewitnesses and evi-
dence as to the manner in which the accident occurred is not 
fatal to plaintiff's case. 
[11] Evidence-Sufficiency-Circumstantial Evidence.-To estab-
lish a theory by circumstantial evidence it is not necessary 
that the facts be such and so related to each other that such 
theory is the only conclusion that can fairly or reasonably be 
drawn. 
[12] Id.-Sufficlcncy-ClircumstantinJ Evidence.-A plaintiff rely-
injii on c.ir<:um::;tautial evide1wc docs not have to exclude the 
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possibility of every other reasonable inference possibly de$ 
rivahle from the facts proved. 
[13] Automobiles-Nonsuit.-In an action for injuries to a 51lz· 
year-old boy who was struck by an ice truck operating on the 
private streets of a trailer camp, where there was in evidence 
the child's statement to the officers and his mother that the 
truck ran over him, the driver's statement "I hit him," and 
the driver's statement of his knowledge of children playing 
in the area, that he did not sound his horn, and that he did 
not look to the right or left as he made a left-hand turn, it 
was reasonably inferable that, had he looked, he would have 
seen plaintiff, or, had he sounded his horn, he would have 
warned the child away from the moving truck, and it was 
error to grant a nonsuit as to such driver. 
[14] !d.-Evidence-Injuries to Children in Streets.-In an action 
for injuries to a 5ljz-year-old boy who was struck by an ice 
truck operating on the private streets of a trailer camp, where 
there was evidence relatmg to the condition and position of 
the child's body about 20 feet from the corner of a street at 
which the driver made a left turn, and where the evidence 
showed that the child was on his way back from the park bath-
room and that there was only a dirt road on which to walk, 
the inference was that he was walking in the street at the 
time he was struck by defendant's truck. 
[15] Agency-Existence-Evidence-Declarations of Agent.-An 
agency cannot be established by declarations of the agent not 
under oath or in the principal's presence. 
[16] Automobiles-Nonsuit.-In an action for injuries to a 5%-
year-old boy who was struck by an ice truck operating on the 
private streets of a trailer camp, a nonsuit as to defendant 
ice company was properly granted where the uncontradicted 
facts shvwed a wholesaler-retailer relationship between such 
defendant and defendant truck driver, and where there was 
no evid~?nce of sufliciPnt substantinlity on the issue of agency 
to have permitted the cause to go to the jury. 
APPEAI; from judgmrnts of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Wilbur C. Curtis, Judge. One judgment 
affirmed; other judgment reversed. 
Action for damages for personal injuries. Judgment of 
nonsuit in favor of defendant Union Ice Company, affirmed; 
judgment of nonsuit in favor of defendant Charles Irwin 
Ingram, reversed. 
{15] See Cal.Jur.2d, Agency, § 15; Am.Jur., Agency, § 445. 
v. UNION IcE Co. 33 
C.2d 30; 286 P.2d 211 
Elconin Benjamin Elconin, Hirson & Horn and 
Theodore A. Horn for Appellant. 
P. Kinkle and George P. Kinkle, Jr., for Respondent 
Union Ice Co. 
& Ruppe and E. Spurgeon Rothrock for 
J.-This is an appeal by plaintiff from judg-
nonsuit entered in favor of defendants Charles Irwin 
(sued as Charles Irwin lngerman) and Union Ice 
for damages for personal injuries. 
a 51fz-year-old boy, was run over, or hit, and 
seriously and permanently injured by an ice truck driven by 
defendant Ingram. The only question involved is whether 
there was sufiicient evidence of negligence on the part of 
Ingram to permit the case to go to the jury. A subsidiary 
is whether there was sufficient evidence of an agency 
relationship between defendant Ingram and defendant Ice 
Company to submit that issue to the jury. 
There were no eyewitnesses to the accident which occurred 
in the early afternoon, around 2 o'clock and the evidence is 
almost without conflict. The record shows that plaintiff, and 
his family, lived in a trailer camp or park which was privately 
owned. The trailer camp contains two north-south roads 
(" C" and "B ") about 20 or 22 feet wide which are unpaved 
and full of chuckholes and bumps and ruts. These roads 
have neither curbs, nor sidewalks and are used by both 
pedestrian and vehicle trafiic. On either side of each street 
are the trailer houses. There is a road running east and west 
at the southern end of the camp. The Hilyar trailer was 
located on the east side of "0" street, the small north-south 
road on the west side of the camp. The only bath and toilet 
house in the camp is located in the southwest corner of "0" 
street at its most northerly end. Plaintiff's mother was 
visiting in a trailer located on the westerly side of "B" street 
and had permitted plaintiff to go to the bathhouse alone as 
he had often done before if, as she testified, he would come 
right back. Defendant Ingram, driving a truck bearing the 
name "UNION IcE" in large block letters on both its doors, 
was delivering ice to the trailer on the southwest corner of 
ec.2d-a 
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"C" street; this trailer was directly opposite that in which 
the Hilyars lived. Driver testified that after he had 
delivered the ice, be walked around from the right side of his 
truck to the back; that there were children playing around it 
and that he warned them i.o get away from the truck; that he 
then got back "up" on the truck and started the motor; 
that he ''glanced in my mirrors and headed south for a few 
feet and made my left-hand turn east." This testimony shows 
that he was driving south, that he turned to the left into the 
east-west street and proceeded in an easterly direction. He 
testified that he looked through the mirrors when he started 
up; that he looked out of the truck to see if there were any 
children to the right or left of the truck; that he was driving 
in second g·ear at from 3 to 4 miles an hour; that he did not 
sound his horn. He testified that he drove along the east-
west street until he carne to '' B'' street, a distance of about 
65 feet, and that he again made a left-hand tnrn in order 
to proceed in a northerly direction on "B" street. The 
record shows that as he made the turn onto "B" street, he 
did not sound his horn, nor did he look to see if there were any 
children on the right, or around the truck and he didn't see 
any children ; that as he was about 20 feet from the corner 
(where he made the turn) the :first he knew that anything 
unusual had happened was when he heard "some kind of noise 
in the back" and a little boy (not the injured child) "hol-
lered'' at him that something had happened ''back there''; 
that he jumped out of the 12ft, or driver's, seat of the truck 
and started down toward where the injured child was lying 
calling for help. The injured child was lying on the road in 
a prone position about 20 feet from the corner and approxi-
mately 2 feet from a picket fence on the easterly side of the 
street. The record shOYIS that right after the acciclent de-
fendant Ingram kept yelling "l\1y God! My God! I hit him." 
Mrs. Hilyar testified that plaintiff, immediately after the 
accident, said ''I was 1valking and the truck hit me''; that 
the accident occurred "not more than ten minutes" after the 
child had left for the bathroom. The child failed to qualify 
as a witness and by stipulation a statement made by him to 
police ofil.cers not long after the accident was admitted in 
evidence. The admitted portion of the statement consisted 
of the following: "Stated he was walking alongside an ice 
truck and the truck turned a corner knocking him to the 
groun{l and nm over h back Stnted he ,.,as also knocked into 
the fence at his right ;;;ide. V iet.im .••• " 
HrLYAR v. UNioN IcE Co. 
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The record shows that defendant Ingram had delivered ice 
to the trailer court for approximatley three years; that he 
knew children played in the area. It is also shown that the 
truck was a high-bed model with solid sides and a closed cab 
some distance from the ground. There were running boards 
underneath both doors. The overall length was approximately 
15 feet. 
Bearing in mind that this is an appeal from judg-
ments of nonsuit and the rule that " ... a nonsuit may be 
granted only when, disregarding conflicting evidence, giving 
to plaintiff's evidence all the value to which it is legally 
entitled and indulging in every legitimate inference which 
may be drawn from that evidence favorable to plaintiff's case, 
the result is a determination that there is no evidence of 
sufficient substantiality to support a verdict in favor of plain-
tiff" (Dunn v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 43 Cal.2d 265, 268 
[272 P.2d 745] ; Palmquist v. Mercer, 43 Cal.2d 92, 95 (272 
P.2d 26]; Warner v. Santa Catalina Island Co., 44 Cal.2d 
310 [282 P.2d 12]) we must look at plaintiff's evidence 
and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in order to deter-
mine whether it can be said as a matter of law that there 
is no evidence of negligence on the part of defendant Ingram. 
[2] Ingram was aware that children played in the area 
of the streets of the trailer camp; he was aware that there 
were children around his truck when he started to drive from 
'' C'' to '' B'' street; he admitted be had not sounded his horn; 
that he did not look for children on the right of the truck, nor 
around it. From the pictures of the truck in evidence, it 
could have been logically inferred that because of its height 
and the distance of the cab windows from the road, that a. 
small child could have been directly in front of the cab, 
or at either side, without being seen by the driver unless 
he were keeping a close watch for children. The only direct 
evidence of care exercised by the driver is his testimony that 
he looked in his rear-view mirrors for children when he first 
started up. There is no evidence that after starting he 
looked out the side windows, or the front windshield. From 
this the trier of fact could have determined that when looking 
through the mirrors, he might have missed seeing a small 
child directly in front of him. There is evidence that at no 
time did defendant Ingram sound his horn to warn children 
away from the moving vehicle. From the child's statement 
that the truck hit him and ran over his back, it could have 
been reasonably inferred that he was either in front of the 
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truck as it made the turn, or slightly to its left. From 
defendant Ingram's testimony that he did not see tbe child, 
it could have been inferred that he did not see tlw (·hild 
because he was not exercising the care commensurate with the 
danger to be avoided in that he knew small children played 
in the area and knew, or should have known, that chih1ren 
are unpredictable v. Central-Gaither U. Sch. Dist., 
13:3 Cal..App. 124 [23 P.2d 769] ). 
'l'he police officer, 'rhomas, testified that in 's signrd 
statement to him concerning the accident, he had stated 
that he was driving between 4 and 5 miles an hour. The 
jury may Yery well have believed this statement concerning 
the speed of the vehicle and have concluded that such speed 
was not the exercise of due care under all the circumstances. 
[3] All persons are required to use ordinary care to pre-
vent others being injured as the result of their conduct; 
ordinary care is that degree of care which people of ordinarily 
prudent behavior can be reasonably expected to exercise under 
the circumstances of a given case. [4] In other words, the 
care required must be in proportion to the danger to be 
avoided and the consequences that might reasonably be antici-
pated (Crowe v. McBride, 25 Ca1.2d 318, 321 [153 P.2d 727]; 
Hatzalcorzian v. Rucker-Fnller Desk Co., 197 Cal. 82, 98 
[239 P. 709, 41 A.L.R. 1027]; Warner v. Santa Catalina 
Island Co., sttpra, 44 Cal.2d 310; Jensen v. Minard, 44 Cal.2d 
325 [287 P.2d 7]). 
[5] In Conroy v. Perez, 64 Cal.App.2d 217, 224 [148 P.2d 
680], it was held that "The presence of children is in itself 
a warning requiring the exercise of care for their safety. 
(Seperman v. Lyon Fire Proof Stomge Co., 97 Cal.App. 654 
[275 P. 980] .) [6] Moreover, if the evidence shows that a 
driver has knowledge of the presence of children he may be 
held to have been responsible although it appears that he did 
not see the injured child in time to prevent the injury. 
(See 2 Cal.Jur. 10-Yr. Supp., p. 454.) This is especially 
true where the injury occurs in or about the child's home. 
(Cambou v. Marty, 98 Cal.App. 598 [277 P. 365] .) " 
[7] There can be no question but that here the driver of the 
ice truck knew that children were playing in the area. He, 
himself, testified that he had warned the children away from 
the truck; he also testified that he had not sounded his horn 
from the time he started it up until the plaintiff was hit. 
The accident occurred not far from the rhild 's home. It was 
daylight, the view was unobstructed, and the trier of fact. 
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1lwt the driver's con(luct under 
cireumstances, was not the degree of care required of one 
a instrumentality in the immediate Yieinity 
swall cllildn'n !Jensen v. Jllinard, supra, 44 Cal.2,1 323). 
, subdiyision (b), of the Vehicle Code pro-
driver of a motor vehicle when reasonably 
to iwmre safe operation shall give audible warn-
his horn. 'Vhether under the circumstances here 
it "reasonably necessary" to sound the horn 
operation'' should have been a question of 
In Ducat v. Goldner, 77 Cal.App.2d 332, 
I 175 P.2d , it was held that "appellant had no right 
to a;::;ume that the road wa~ clear but it was his duty to be 
and to anticipate the presence of others in the 
'l'he fact that he did not know that respondent was 
in the street is no excuee for his failure to give warning 
v. Lagomarsino, 196 Cal. 308, 317 [237 P. 1066]; 
v. Bradford. 54 Cal.App. 157, 159 [201 P. 471) ) .... " 
It was there held tbat the darkness of the streets and the 
condition of the weather required that a reasonably prudent 
person should sound his horn to insure the safe operation 
of his vehicle when turning a corner at a place where a 
pedestrian might reasonably be expected to be found. In 
Ji'recland v. J cwcl Tea Co., 118 Cal.App.2d 764, 769 [258 P.2d 
1032], it was held that it is ordinarily necessary to exercise 
care for the protection and safety of young children 
than for adult persons possessing normal and mature facul-
ties (Conroy v. Perez, supra, 64 Cal.App.2d 217, 224); that 
their conduct is unpredictable and one operating a motor 
vehicle should anticipate their thoughtlessness and impulsive-
nc~s (Shannon v. Ccnt1·al-Gaither U. Sch. Dist., supra, 133 
Cal.App. 124). It was also held that the presence of children 
itself a warning requiring the exercise of care for their 
'l'he conrt concluded that where children were known 
to be playing in the strret, the negligence, if any, of the 
driYer of a motor vehicle was a question of fact for the jury. 
In De La Torre v. Valenzuela, 102 Cal.App.2d 586 [228 P.2d 
, it was held to be a question of fact for the jury whether 
or not under all the circumstances defendant's failure to 
sound a horn proximately contributed to plaintiff's injury. 
It has been held in numerous cases that the issue of proxi-
mate cause is essentially one of fact (De La Torre v. Valen-
supra, 102 Cal.App.2d 586, 591; Fennessey v. Paci~ 
G(l.$ Q; Elec. Co.1 20 Cal.2d 141 [124 P.2d 51] ; Mosle31 v. Arden 
HILYAR v. UNION ICE Co. C.2d 
Farms Co., 26 Cal.2d 213, 219 [157 P.2d 372, 158 A.L.R 872]; 
Crowe v. McBrlde, supra, 25 Cal.2d 318, 321; Warner v. Santa 
Catalina Island Co., supra, 44 Cal.2d 310; Dunn v. Pacific 
Gas & Elec. Co., supra, 43 Cal.2d 265, 278). [9] TTnrler the 
circumstances here presented, whether or not dGfu,dant driv-
er's failure to sound the horn, or his failure to look more 
closely for children in his way, constituted the proximate cause 
of plaintiff's injuries should have been submitted to the jury. 
As the court said in Fredericksen v. Costner, 99 CaLApp.2d 
453, 458 [221 P.2d 1008], whether defendant was negligent in 
starting his truck without making any further effort to ascer-
tain the conduct and whereabouts of the plaintiff's decedent 
was a question of fact. "It cannot be said, as a matter of 
law, that he exercised the degree of care which a reasonable 
person would have exercised nnder similar circumstances to 
protect Cheryl [decedent] from harm. The case presents 
a question of fact which should have been left to the jury." 
Defendant Ingram contends that a verdict and judgment 
cannot rest upon conjecture and speculation. He argues 
that there is no evidence concerning the point of impact. 
[10] In Dunn v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., supra, 43 Cal.2d 
265, 278-279, it was held that an absence of eyewitnesses and 
evidence as to the manner in which the accident occurred 
was not fatal to plaintiff's case. [11] In Sande;·s v. Mac-
Farlane's Candies, 119 CaLApp.2d 497, 500 [259 P.2d 1010], 
where a judgment of nonsuit was reversed, and where there 
were no eyewitnesses, it was said: " 'It is not necessary, in 
order to establish a theory by circumstantial evidence, that 
the facts be such and so related to each other that such 
theory is the only conclusion that can fairly or reasonably 
be drawn therefrom .... ' " (Katenkarnp v. Union Realty 
Co., 36 Cal.App.2d 602, 617 [98 P.2d 239].) (12] "The 
plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence does not have to 
exclude the possibility of every other reasonable inference 
possibly deri vnble from the facts proved. ( Vaccarezza v. 
Sanguinetti, 71 Cal.App.2d 687, 692 [163 P.2d 470]; Spolter 
v. Fonr-Whcel Brahe Serv. Co., s~tpra, [99 Cal.App.2d 6~!0 
(222 P.2d 307)], at p. 694.)" (Sanders v. JlacFarlane's 
Candies, supra, 119 Ca1.App.2d 497, 500; see also Summers 
v. Tice, 33 Cal.2d 80 [199 P.2d 1, 5 A.L.R.2d 91] .) 
Defendant Ingram relies upon Greene v. A.tchison, T. & 
S. F. Ry. Co., 120 Cal.App.2d 135, J42 [260 P.2d 834, 40 
A.I.1.R.2d 873]. in ~npport of his theory that a judgment for 
plaintiff here would be the result of conjecture and specula-
HusAR v. UNION IcE Oo. 39 
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the Greene caGe, 's decedent was found 
near the railroad tracks. 'l'here were no witnesses; 
there 1vas only the inference, from the position and condition 
of the that a train, or some portion thereof, must have 
the decedent. The court there held that if there was 
including reasonable infereucrs therefrom, 
would support a finding of defendant's negligence, the 
of nonsuit must be reversed. The Greene case 
distin~uished from the one under consideration. 
Here we have ihr child's statement to the officers and 
mother that the truck ran over him; we have the driver's 
statement "I hit him!"; we have the driver's statement of 
his of children playing in the area and that he 
did uot sound his horn, and that he did not look to the right 
or left as he made his left-ham! turn into "B" street. From 
evidence it is reasonably inferable that had he looked, 
would have seen the plaintiff, or that had he sounded his 
horn. he would have warned the child away from the moving 
trnek. 
[14] Defendant driver also argues that there is no evidence 
relating to the point of impact. There is no merit to this 
argument because from the evidence relating to the condition 
and position of the child's body, and from his statements to 
his mother and the police, and from Mrs. Hilyar 's testimony 
that the child was lying about 2 feet from the picket fence, 
it could be reasonably concluded that the child was hit close 
to the corner of '' B'' street at its intersection with the east-
\Yest street about 20 feet therefrom. Becam'e the evidence 
shows tlwt the child vvas on his way back from the park 
bathroom and that there was only the dirt road on which to 
walk. the inference is that he was walking in the street at 
the time he \Vas struck by defendant's truck 
Plaintiff contN1ds, and defendant Union Ice Company 
denies. that an agency relationship existed between Ingram 
and the company. The record shows tlJat on both doors of 
the cab of tl1e truel' appeared a shield with the vvords "U::-.aoN 
ICE" in large block letters. Printed in much smaller letters 
just over the sign, appeared the name "Chas, Ingram" and 
in letters of approximately the same size. underneath the 
words "UNION IcE" appeared the word "Distrilmtor. '' The 
shield on which these words were painted was red, white 
and blue, apparently the colors of the Union Ice Company, 
From the photographs, it appe<Jrs that the words "Chas, 
Ingram" and "Distributor" had been painted in a rather 
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amateurish fashion, while the words "UNION ICE" appeared 
to have been done professionally. The evidence appears to 
be without conflict that the truck was owned by Ingram; 
that Union Ice Company furnished no parts, tires, repairs, 
or any parking space therefor. 
A contract, or agreement, existed between defendant In-
gram and defendant Union Ice Company. It was provided 
therein that Ingram was designated as the "Distributor" 
and the company as the "Manufacturer." It appeared that 
Union Ice had entered into similar contracts with other dis-
tributors by which they were given certain territories in 
which to sell ice. The agreement provided that the manu-
facturer would "sell" ice to the distributor who would "buy" 
it at certain presl:ribed prices and sell it at retail at ''such 
reasonable prices as shall yield a reasonable profit unto the 
Distributor, al](] in no event at a minimum price lower than 
that for which the Manufacturer itself sells ice at retail to 
the same classes of trade as served by the Distributor, as set 
forth ... " on current schedules. The agreement provided it 
was to continue for a five-year period; that it was not as-
signable without the manufacturer's consent; and that if the 
distributor desired to sell his ''ice merchandising and dis-
tributing business,'' the manufacturer was to be given ten 
days' notice and an option to purchase at the terms offered 
by any prospective purchaser. The agreement provided that 
the distributor was to give his "faithful, active and con-
scientious personal attention to the sale and distribution" 
of ice in his own territory. It was provided, also, that he 
was not to sell out of his territory. Any failure to comply 
with the terms of the contract was to be considered a breach 
thereof for whicll the contract might be terminated. The 
contract provided that each distributor was an independent 
contractor and that it was not intended to create the '' rela-
tionship of employee and employer, principal and agent, or 
that of master and servant.'' 
Defendant Ingram testified that he had distributed ice 
manufactured by Union Ice Company since 1951; that he 
had handled no other ice; that he took ice out on one day 
and paid for it the next morning; that he had no regular 
hours; that at a time when he had employed others, he had not 
checked with the company. Police Officer Thomas testified 
that Ingram had signed a statement a few hours after the 
accident in which he had said that he was employed by the 
Union Ice Company giving its address and phone number. 
Hn .. YAR v. UNION IcE Co. 
[45 C.2d 30; 286 P.2d 21 l 
VIce manager of the 
(by deposition) that distributors were 
to use the sign "Union Ice Products" on their 
and that after the accident defendant made 
to some official of the company. 
relies principally on the case of Smith v. Deutsch, 
419 [200 P.2d 802], in support of his theory 
of agency was sufficient to submit the issue 
Defendant ice company relies upon the case 
Meadow Creameries v. Industria}, Ace. Com., 
123 [76 P.2d 724], as negating the agency 
These cases will be discussed. 
In the Smith case, supra, plaintiff was struck by a taxicab 
in the distinctive colors adopted by the cab company 
operated by the association. The words ''War Vet-
Taxicab" were painted on the sides of each cab. It 
was held that this evidence was sufiicient evidence of owner-
An oD'icer of the War Veterans 'raxicab Association 
that the association never had a franchise in Los 
; that it owned no cabs; that it had no stands from 
which cabs were dispatched; that it did not direct cabs to any 
location; that it did not receive a percentage of what the 
drivers received in revenue; that members operated their 
own cabs; that the driver of the cab in question was not a 
member of the association. Other evidence showed that the 
driver drove the cab with the knowledge and consent of 
defendant association. After the accident, an association 
~"".""on,.. 's car drove to the scene, showed his card to police 
officers and made measurements, etc.; he remained until a 
tow ear removed the taxicab. It was noted by the court that 
by-Jaws of the association showed that the association 
exercised powers of control over the drivers and that one 
of the grounds for expulsion of members was the "inability 
perform the duties for which the member of this associa-
tion was expressly employed to do." The court relied on 
the case of Callas v. Independent Taxi Owners' Assn., Inc., 
66 F.2d 192 [62 App.D.C. 212], in which the "situation 
almost identical with that in the instant case that 
the liability of the defendant was a question of fact to be de-
termined by the jury; that it was not a question of law; that 
plaintiff's case rested on the presumption of ownership arising 
from the fact that the cab bore its name and colors; that 
the presumption was evidence and was sufficient to take the 
case to the jury." The court concluded that the evidence 
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was so complete as to leave no doubt that Deu1s~h was operat-
ing under the direction and control of defendant association. 
In the case at bar there is no question concerning the owner-
ship of the truck-the evidence is without conflict that it was 
owned by defendant Ingram. 
In the Mountain Meadow case, supra, there was a con-
tract between the Mountain Meadow Creameries, called the 
Producer, and one Dodge, called the Distributor. The pro-
ducer granted to the distributor the right to sell dairy prod-
ucts in a certain territory; the distributor paid cash on de-
livery of the products to him; the distributor was required 
to purchase and maintain a delivery truck and to wear uni-
forms. The contract provided that it was not intended to 
create the relationship of principal and agent between the 
producer and the distributor. 'l'he contract provided that 
it might be terminated by giving written notice. The court 
said: "When we take the contract by its four corners and 
construe it as a whole, the conclusion is inescapable that the 
Mountain Meadow Creameries placed a milk route in pos-
session of Dodge; that Dodge was required to purchase his 
supplies from the corporation and deliver them to the con-
sumers within the district allotted to him. The corporation 
occupied the position of a wholesaler who furnished Dodge, 
a retailer, with an initial list of customers and sold him mer-
chandise at wholesale prices. Dodge, the retailer, delivered 
these supplies to the customers and collected the retail prices 
from them." (P. 127.) The termination clause in the con-
tract was construed by the court as not equivalent to the right 
of discharge possessed by an employer. 
[15] It appears to us that the Mountain Meadow case is 
more nearly analogous to the one under consideration than 
is the Smith case. In the case at bar, the uncontradicted facts 
show a wholesaler-retailer relationship. The only evidence 
to the contrary is Ingram's statement to the officer that he 
was "employed" by the Union Ice Company. In Fesler v. 
Rawlins, 43 Cal.App.2d 541, 544 [111 P.2d 380], it was said: 
"It is axiomatic that agency cannot be established by the 
declarations of the agent not under oath or in the presence 
of the principal. As stated in 1 California Jurisprudence, 
698. 'if the rule were otherwise any rogue could use the name 
of an honest man to facilitate his roguery.' " See also 
Mechem Outlines Agency (3d ed.), § 112, p. 68.) 
It follows that the nonsuit was improperly granted as to 
defendant Ingram in that the evidence was sufficient on the 
MANNING's, INc. v. BuRKETT 
[45 C.2d 43; 286 P.2d 131 
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of his negligence to permit the submission of the cause to 
1 he jury. [16] The nonsuit as to the defendant Union Ice 
Company was properly granted in that there is no evidence 
snfficient substantiality on the issue of agency to have per-
mitted the cause to go to the jury. 
The judgment in favor of defendant Ingram is therefore 
and the judgment in favor of defendant Union Ice 
Company is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Traynor, J., 
[S. F. No. 19213. In Bank. July 29. 1955.] 
:!fANNING'S, INC. (a Corporation), Appellant, v. WIL-
LIAM A. BURKETT, as Director of Employment, etc., 
Respondent. 
[1] Unemployment Insurance·-Actions to Recover Contributions 
Paid.-A complaint to recover unemployment insurance con-
tributions allegedly overpaid by a corporate employer for the 
years 1944 and 1945 sufficiently alleges a duty by defendant 
Director of Employment to refund any overpayments made by 
plaintiff during the pendency of a protest proceeding filed by 
it, notwithstanding a failure to allege that proper and timely 
protests were filed by plaintiff in those years, and it is error 
to sustain a demurrer to the complaint without leave to amend, 
where that part of Unemployment Insurance Act, § 41.1, as it 
read when the overpayments were allegedly made, requiring 
that a protest be made within 6G days after the mailing of a 
statement, did not apply to statements furnished to plaintiff 
during the pendency of the protest proceeding- filed by it. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the 
City and County of San Francisco. 
Judge. Reversed. 
Superior Court of the 
Herbert C. Kaufman, 
Action by corporate employer against Director of Employ-
ment to recover contributions allegedly overpaid to unemploy-
[1] See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1945 Rev.), Unemployment Relief 
-Insurance Act,§ 7 et seq. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1] Unemployment Insurance, § 45. 
